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EXPERT TESTIMONY ON FINGERPRINTS:
AN INTERNET EXCHANGE
Richard Friedman, D.H. Kaye
Jennifer Mnookin, Dale Nance, and Michael Saks*
ABSTRACT: In United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002), a
federal district initially limited expert opinion testimony on fingerprint identifications
because the government was unable to show that such identifications were sufficiently
valid and reliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Then, the court withdrew the
opinion. This article reproduces an exchange of notes on the initial opinion submitted by
five law professors.
CITATION: Richard Friedman, D.H. Kaye, Jennifer Mnookin, Dale Nance, and
Michael Saks, Expert Testimony on Fingerprints: An Internet Exchange, 43 Jurimetrics
J. 91-98 (2002).
Editors' Introduction
In UnitedStates v. Lera Plaza,' the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the ability of fingerprint examiners to conclude that a
"latent" print originated from a particular individual had yet to be scientifically
demonstrated.2 Although several law professors had suggested that such a ruling
*The authors are, respectively, Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan;
Regents' Professor, Arizona State University College of Law, and Fellow, ASU Center for the Study
ofLaw, Science, and Technology; Associate Professor, University ofVirginia Law School; Professor,
Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Professor of Law and Psychology, Arizona State
University.
1. 2002 WL 27305 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7,2002) [Llera Plaza ], vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D.
Pa. 2002) [Llera Plaza fl].
2. For critical analysis of previous cases rejecting challenges to the scientific underpinnings of
fingerprint evidence, see 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
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was only a matter of time,3 the event sent shock waves through the community of
fingerprint analysts, the FBI, and the Department of Justice. Fearing that
"prosecutorial effectiveness . . . would be seriously compromised,"4 the
government urged the court to reconsider its order that while fingerprint analysts
could inform the jury of the similarities in fingerprints, they could not testify that
the defendant was the source of the print in question.5
After a more complete evidentiary hearing and study of the law of England,
the court reversed itself. "I disagree with myself,"6 wrote the highly respected
judge.7 Some readers will find the first opinion the more persuasive of the two,'
and it remains the sole instance in which a modem court has endorsed the view
that the lack of scientific studies of certain aspects of fingerprint identification
justifies the exclusion of opinions of identity.' Here, we reprint a series of
TESTIMONY 346-67 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002); see also Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet
Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 605 (2002).
3. See Malcolm Ritter, Fingerprints'Accuracy on Trial Evidence, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001,
at Al, available at 2001 WL 2476491.
4. Llera Plaza H1, at 552-53.
5. The order specified that:
The government may present expert fingerprint testimony (1) describing how the rolled and latent
fingerprints at issue in this case were obtained, (2) identifying, and placing before the jury, the
fingerprints and such magnifications as may be required to show minute details, and (3) pointing out
observed similarities (and differences) between any latent print and any rolled print the government
contends are attributable to the same person. The defendants may present expert fingerprint testimony
countering the government's fingerprint testimony. But no expert witness for any party will be permitted
to testify that, in the opinion of the witness, a particular latent print is--or is not-the print of a particular
person.
Llera Plaza 1, at 18.
6. Llera Plaza II, at 570 (referring to the significance of the subjective component of deciding
whether prints match).
7. Before his appointment to the court, Judge Lewis Pollak served as professor and dean at the
law schools of Yale University and the University of Pennsylvania.
8. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 SCIENCE 339 (2002)
(contending that the court shifted its ground from demanding a showing of scientific validity and
reliability to accepting poorly documented claims of "specialized knowledge").
9. Of the more than thirty challenges under Daubert and Kumho Tire to the admissibility of
expert opinions that a latent print is the print of a particular person, not one court ultimately has
excluded it. None of those opinions, including Llera Plaza, has found the evidence offered in support
of admission to meet the requirements of Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702; instead, these
courts have adopted creative alternative "tests" or procedures or presumptions to admit the testimony.
These judicial tactics have included: (1) refusal to conduct a Daubert hearing; (2) reversal of the
burden of proof; (3) ignoring the task-at-hand requirement of Daubert and Kumho Tire and taking
instead a vague, global approach to admissibility; (4) conclusory judgments with no analysis; (4)
substituting trial process criteria for the scientific criteria required byDaubert; (5) turning the holding
of Kumho Tire on its head by narrowing the grounds for scrutinizing expert evidence or sparing the
field making empirical claims from the more scientific criteria of Daubert; (6) over-reliance on
general acceptance; (7) interpreting the flexibility of criteria allowed under Daubert and Kumho Tire
to mean that virtually no criteria are needed, or that no criteria need be applied thoughtfully. Not one
case applies Daubert and Kumho Tire in a reasonably straightforward fashion and finds the existence
of reasonably well-designed empirical tests and acceptable error rates for the task-at-hand (which in
many or most of these cases is the identification of fragmentary or poor quality latent prints). See 3
Faigman et al., supra note 2, at 346-67; id. Supplement § 27-1.2 (forthcoming 2003). That so many
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messages prompted by Lera Plaza I and originally exchanged on an Internet
discussion list maintained for law professors."
To: Evidence Professors Discussion List
From: Richard Friedman
Date: January 15, 2002
The court tookjudicial notice that fingerprints are unique and permanent. The
problem comes in determining that a latent print, which is often imperfect and
incomplete, comes from the same person as a known print. The opinion runs
through the checklist provided in Daubert v. MerrellDowPharmaceuticals, Inc. "
to determine whether an expert's testimony on that point was good evidence. It
decided that it was not, because there is apparently no real scientific standard for
determining what is enough agreement to make an absolute identification. It's all
logical enough, I suppose, but the problem in my view-one that runs through
Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael'2-is the demand that expert
evidence be scientifically based. It's also surprising given that the judge didn't
cite a single horror story in all the years that fingerprinting has been used-i.e.,
no tales of people convicted on the basis offingerprints that were later determined
to be those of other people. He pooh-poohed the government's litigation-testing
theory, which again I think reflects a mistaken approach; if adversarial testing is
able to minimize problems, that suggests the expert's subjective opinion may
indeed be of assistance to the jury within the meaning of FRE 702.
To: Evidence Professors Discussion List
From: D.H. Kaye
Date: January 15, 2002
I agree with Dale Nance['s conclusion in an earlier message] that Judge
Pollak's "compromise is entirely intelligible," but not with Dale's reasoning that
"the likelihood that the fingerprints come from the same person depends not only
on the characteristics of the prints and the circumstances of their discovery but
also on the other evidence in the case implicating the accused. The expert has no
legitimate role in evaluating the latter."
If scientific testing demonstrates that every latent fingerprint is (very
probably) unique and that examiners have a very reliable method for identifying
the unique features, then why should not an examiner using this method be
permitted to testify that the method has identified the individual as the source of
courts have been unwilling to apply Daubert and Kumho faithfully in this setting may reflect
discomfort with the doctrine of those cases, a discomfort shared by some of the participants in this
exchange.
10. These messages have been edited for publication in Jurimetrics and are reprinted with the
permission of the authors. We are not able to include all the messages that were posted but have
selected these initial messages to convey the flavor of the exchange.
11. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
12. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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the latent print? The expert is not evaluating "the other evidence in the case
implicating the accused"-only the fingerprint evidence and its implications. Of
course, scientific studies do not demonstrate the soundness of the methodology,
and so the court limits the expert's testimony to less contentious claims.
I also think that the court got it exactly right when it dismissed the govern-
ment's claim that fingerprint technology had been proved to be scientifically valid
by many years of use in the courtroom. On the other hand, I agree with Rich that
a subjective method should not be deemed inadmissible just because it is
subjective. Methods that involve some subjectivity can be validated, and I think
that Daubert and Kumho Tire would be satisfied by studies along these lines. The
problem that Judge Pollak identified is that, for fingerprinting, these studies have
not been done either.
That said, Rich has an interesting point about the failure to find obvious cases
of false fingerprint testimony. But would not it take awfully powerful evidence to
bring such an error to the surface? There have been, what, only 99 exonerations
of convicted offenders with DNA evidence? There certainly are instances in
which examiners disagree as to whether prints match. Is it really clear that every
person who was convicted using fingerprint evidence was the source of the latent
prints?
To: Evidence Professors Discussion List
From: Dale Nance
Date: January 15, 2002
Consider two hypothetical cases that are identical in every respect except one.
Both involve an expert assessing fingerprints from the crime scene and the
accused. The degree of similarity between the prints in the two cases is the same.
(Stay with me, here; this is a thought experiment.) In one case, the defendant's
whereabouts at the time of the crime is unknown; in the other, the accused offers
testimony by police from a nearby city that the accused was in custody at the time
of the crime. Isn't the probability that the accused left the crime scene fingerprints
different in the two cases? If the experts in the two cases offer opinions about
whether the fingerprints came from the respective accuseds, mustn't those
opinions take into account the evidence about whereabouts? If so, why is the
fingerprint expert properly offering an opinion that requires things like the
assessment of the reliability of the testimony of the police witnesses offered by the
accused in the second case?
To: Evidence Professors Discussion List
From: Michael Saks
Date: January 15, 2002
The problem arises from the fact that the fingerprint examiner is incorporat-
ing into his opinion information which is extraneous to (reaches outside the
bounds of) the expertise which the fingerprint expert claims. The solution is to
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prevent the examiner from even knowing about that information, and to have
someone else combine these different pieces of evidence.
It is now common practice for experts to have access to other evidence,
which causes the problems you suggest as well as others (double counting of
evidence, experts "adjusting" their evidence to be consistent with other facts in
the case, and so on). 3
To: Evidence Professors Discussion List
From: Jennifer Mnookin
Date: January 15, 2002
I agree with Rich that the most fundamental issue this case raises is just how
"scientific" expert evidence should have to be in order to be admitted. However,
in my view, Judge Pollak is probably right that fingerprinting fails Daubert, or at
least it's a close case: the error rate is basically unknown, though limited (and not
blind) proficiency testing suggests that examiners do make lots of mistakes; the
claim that partial smudged prints in particular can be associated uniquely with a
person is basically untested; the standards for determining a "match" are
subjective and tested only through experience rather than any formal study, and
so on.
Judge Pollak also, in my view, gets a couple of subpoints absolutely right.
First, while "adversarial testing" by an opposing party may or may not be an
effective way to minimize problems with expert evidence, it certainly is not the
kind of testing that Daubert envisioned. Second, Judge Pollak properly takes to
task the fingerprint experts' claims that the error rate is zero: fingerprint
examiners and prosecutors have been arguing in these Daubert challenges (of
which there have now been roughly 25, though Lera Plaza was the first to be
even partially successful) that the "theoretical" error rate for fingerprinting is zero
if the technique is used correctly. This, however, borders on the tautological (if
the method is perfectly done, it will operate correctly), and in all events is
obviously not the error rate with which we need to be concerned. The appropriate
question is what the on-the-ground actual error rate is.
FALL 2002
13. See Michael Risinger, Michael Saks, Robert Rosenthal & William Thompson, The
Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of
Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2002) (discussing the problem of context
information in forensic science and offering possible solutions).
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As for real-life errors, there have in fact been some that have come to light;
Simon Cole's recent book on criminal identification systems, Suspect Identities, 4
provides some details.'"
To my mind, the hard and interesting question is this: If fingerprinting fails
Daubert, does this suggest the limits of fingerprinting or the limits of Daubert?
I'd say that it reveals both at once: it is astounding the extent to which fingerprint
examiners' techniques have not been validated. That fingerprint examiners have
been permitted (since 1911 !) to testify in a language of certainty (routinely giving
their opinion that they are 'positive' that the prints came from the same person),
without any rigorous statistical basis for this claim, is something of a scandal. At
the same time, fingerprinting is nonetheless probably a whole lot more reliable
than a great deal of nonexpert evidence that we routinely permit (take, for
example, eyewitness testimony), so it seems somewhat perverse to exclude it.
That said, Judge Pollak's compromise-to permit expert testimony about
similarities and differences but prohibit the fingerprint examiner from expressing
a conclusion about identity-does strike me as problematic. The real problem is
that we lack any empirical foundation to provide a denominator, the equivalent
of a random match probability for DNA. We simply don't really know how likely
it is that a random person's print might appear to match a partial smudged print
found at the scene of a crime. Without that information, what exactly is the jury
supposed to make of the expert's delineation of similarities? The factfinder knows
that not everyone's prints would match, and perhaps even believes that such
matches would be rare (or, given the tremendous cultural authority of fingerprints,
even unique), but the denominator is in fact unknown. So is allowing testimony
about similarities without an opinion about the meaning of these similarities
actually helpful to thejury, or does it risk significant and disturbing misestimation
errors? It strikes me as quite different from typical nonexpert identification
evidence (the perpetrator and the suspect are both brunettes, or both have a mole,
or whatever) in that in those cases we expect (rightly or wrongly) that lay jurors
14. SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION (2001). This book has outraged the fingerprint community. See, e.g., Brendan I.
Koerner, As the Whorl Turns, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 20-26, 2002, available at http://www.
villagevoice.com/issues/0212/koemer.php (noting that the examiners' "most venomous attacks" have
focused on Cole); http://onin.com/fp/stmt-ref articles.html (updated Apr. 4,2002) (criticizing Cole
as a publicity hound).
15. Cases in which the prosecution offers evidence that two fingerprints match, but the defense
offers rebuttal evidence and the jury acquits, as in the celebrated case of Shirley McKie, described
in COLE, supra note 14, at 283, do not constitute a "horror story." On the other hand, a case like that
of Roger Caldwell (see State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982)), in which the prosecution
offers incorrect fingerprint evidence, the defense fails to counter it, and the defendant is convicted,
does represent a terrible breakdown of the system--even if the error comes to light at a later time (as
it did for Caldwell, in the trial of another defendant) and the defendant is freed. Cole does not have
evidence to suggest that such breakdowns have occurred with significant frequency, but part of the
problem is that we know almost nothing about the frequency of erroneous testimony declaring a
fingerprint match; moreover, whether our current system typically does detect such errors when they
do occur is far from certain.
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will have some intuitive sense about frequencies. With fingerprints, juries don't
have any experiential basis for an intuitive sense of frequencies.
To: Evidence Professors Discussion List
From: D.H. Kaye
Date: January 15, 2002
Dale wrote, "Consider two hypothetical cases that are identical in every
respect except one. Both involve an expert assessing fingerprints from the crime
scene and the accused. The degree of similarity between the prints in the two
cases is the same. (Stay with me, here; this is a thought experiment.)" I think this
changes the hypothetical I offered of testimony involving sufficient points of
comparison to claim uniqueness (as verified by sufficient empirical research). But
I shall stay with him anyway.
"In one case, the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the crime is
unknown; in the other, the accused offers testimony by police from a nearby city
that the accused was in custody at the time of the crime. Isn't the probability that
the accused left the crime scene fingerprints different in the two cases?" Yes. To
be clear about what "the probability" refers to, let S, stand for the event that DI
is the source, S. that D2 is the source, F the fallible observation of the similar
fingerprint match, and W the whereabouts of D, and D. The conditional
probabilities are P(S, I F nW) and P(S2 I F nW). These are different.
"If the experts in the two cases offer opinions about whether the fingerprints
came from the respective accuseds, mustn't those opinions take into account the
evidence about whereabouts?" No. An expert can testify that based on the
fingerprint alone, one can conclude Si (or S). The conditional probabilities are
the same. In the notation introduced above, P(SIF) = P(S21F). In Dale's
hypothetical, the expert who so testifies could be in error because of a mistaken
belief, on the basis of an adequately validated theory, that the fingerprint match
is sufficiently detailed to be conclusive.
"If so, why is the fingerprint expert properly offering an opinion that requires
things like the assessment of the reliability of the testimony of the police witnesses
offered by the accused in the second case?" The opinion I proposed was more
circumscribed, but it hinges on establishing that fingerprint examiners can reliably
ascertain uniquely individuating features. As Jennifer points out, that has not been
shown to be the case. (I merely postulated it to make a logical point.) Ideally, the
expert would testify in terms of likelihoods-how probable the matching
characteristics are if the two prints are from the same source, and how probable
they are if they are from different sources.' 6 Of course, on the basis of the research
to date, these numbers are difficult to estimate. Yet, it is clear that there is useful
information in the fingerprints, and the question becomes whether Judge Pollak's
solution (or something like it) is better than the alternatives of (1) excluding all
16. See, e.g., RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF EVIDENCE 96 (2d ed. 1998).
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the expert testimony about a match and its implications or (2) allowing what may
well be overstated opinion testimony.
To: Evidence Professors Discussion List
From: Dale Nance
Date: January 16, 2002
Michael has identified the nature of the problem that I was raising. As an
initial reaction, I wonder whether shielding is an adequate solution if the expert
is going to give an opinion about identity. In my hypothetical, if we shield the
expert in Case 2 from information about the alibi evidence offered by the accused,
that doesn't necessarily mean that the expert is opining without regard to the
information beyond the scope of his expertise. It means, rather, that the expert will
(at least in some cases, perhaps in all cases) be making assumptions about that
background information based on expectations derived from previous experience.
For example, if shielded from information about the alibi, the expert-in order to
opine on the probability that the crime prints came from the suspect (rather than
giving information about the likelihood ratio)-will (must, may?) make some
assumption (implicitly?) about the priors, and that will presumably be that this
case is like the typical case of this crime. If so, that will rule out making the
assumption of a police alibi, since that is very unusual.
That's why I also agree that we should use the DNA model and restrict the
expert testimony to communicating the coincidental match probability in some
fashion, that is, after there is sufficient scientific basis for calculating such a
probability. Until that is possible, we have to choose between precluding an
opinion on identity or, as you suggest, allowing an opinion that is acknowledged
to be without scientific basis. (Perhaps there are other alternatives.)
I think Judge Pollak's choice is plausible, and will certainly provide more
incentive to do the needed scientific work than the alternative of allowing a
nonscientific, but nonetheless expert opinion on identity. I am also less worried
about the risk of "misestimation" error that Jennifer rightly notes about Llera
Plaza's approach-one that arises from the fact that jurors have no experience
from which to obtain an intuitive or common sense coincidental match probabil-
ity, at least in fingerprint cases. Allowing testimony about similarities demon-
strates to the jury that the police were doing their job in obtaining fingerprint
evidence, evidence that, in the case, does not convincingly exonerate the accused;
moreover, their intuitive coincidental match probabilities are likely to be
overestimated (thus favoring the accused) in the absence of hard statistics (and
indeed even in their presence, if they should become available).
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